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Abstract
We examine the dynamics that may compensate the cost of redistribution policy in
the European Union (EU), which is one of the obstacles for a candidate member country,
namely Turkey to be admitted. We adress two main issues: i) may a total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) increase in the candidate country due to the positive eﬀect of accession on
institutional development compensate the cost of redistribution policy and ii) may free cap-
ital mobility before accession decrease EU’s incentive for admitting the candidate country.
In a two-country model we assume that after Turkish accession, the European household
gives a transfer to the Turkish household whereas an upward TFP shift arises in Turkey
due to the positive eﬀect of accession on institutional development. We ﬁrst ﬁnd that a
TFP increase in Turkey compensates the cost of transfer. Second, allowing for free capital
mobility before accession turns out to be unfavorable for admission to the EU.
Keywords: EU accession, Turkey, capital mobility.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F15,F36.
1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) has recently opened membership negotiations with Turkey. How-
ever, it is not certain that these negotiations will lead to Turkey’s accession. 2015 will be the
closest date of membership mentioned on both sides, even if Turkey is admitted to the Union
in the end. Among many political, as well as economic obstacles to Turkey’s accession, one
obstacle is the necessity of redistribution policy that implies transferring incumbent members’
income to the poorer candidate member Turkey.
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redistribution policy, which might form an incentive for the incumbent members of the EU to
admit the candidate member country.1 More speciﬁcally, we address two questions: 1) May a
total factor productivity (TFP) increase in the candidate country due to the positive eﬀect of
accession on institutional progress compensate the cost of redistribution policy? 2) May free
capital mobility before accession decrease EU’s incentive for admitting the candidate country?
In the literature Lejour and de Mooij (2005) and Flam (2004) studied the economic impli-
cations of the possible Turkish accession to the EU. Nonetheless none of these papers raised
our questions. Lejour and de Mooij (2005) simulated the accession of Turkey to the EU by
using a computable general equilibrium model. However they abstracted the transfers from
their analysis. Flam (2004) estimated the budgetary eﬀects of accepting candidate countries
including Turkey to the EU and found that it would be costly for the incumbent members since
some of countries which are the net receipients of transfers might become net contributors.
In exploring our questions we set forth a two-country model, in which one of the countries
is the EU as a single EU-country and the other is Turkey. Each of the countries produces a
heterogeneous good with its own technology. Since there is already a customs union between
Turkey and the EU, we assume free trade between countries, which enables both countries’
households to consume both goods without any additional cost. After Turkish accession, the
European household gives a transfer to the Turkish household for redistribution policy whereas
an upward TFP shift arises in Turkey due to the positive eﬀect of accession on institutional
development. Here, we also consider the experiences of Spain and Portugal whose TFP growth
rates surpassed those of incumbent members after their membership.2 Thereafter, we compare
the utility of the European household before and after accession. To this end, we search for the
maximum level of transfer, where she is indiﬀerent between these two utility levels. First, we
do this exercise when there is no capital in the production function. We next introduce capital
into the model to see the implications of capital mobility on the maximum level of transfer.
We compare the case, in which there is already a capital mobility before accession versus the
case where capital is allowed to move freely only after accession.
We ﬁnd that a TFP increase in Turkey enhances the utility of the household in the EU,
enabling the European household to compensate the cost of transfer given to the Turkish
household. We also ﬁnd that allowing for free capital mobility before accession is unfavorable
for admission to the EU.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we ﬁrst describe a model with two countries
that produce diﬀerent goods using only labor. In Section 3, we introduce capital into the model
and discuss the role of capital mobility. In section 4, we draw some policy implications for
Turkey. Section 6 summarizes the basic ﬁndings and concludes.
1In the paper we represent the admission of Turkey to the EU as a problem of the European household.
2See for instance Caselli and Tenreyro (2006) for a comparison of TFP in Spain and Portugal with that in
France, which is taken as a benchmark throughout the paper for the ”average” European experience.
22 The Model without Capital
This section allows us to see the eﬀect of the candidate member’s accession on the utility of the
incumbent members’ representative household and to compare the negative eﬀect of transfer
payment with the positive eﬀect of a TFP increase that occurs in the candidate member
country, when there is no capital in the production function.
2.1 The Benchmark Model
We consider two countries, one of which is the EU as a single EU-country and Turkey as the
candidate member country. Variables associated with each country will be subscripted as E
for the EU and T for Turkey. Each country i produces one good by the following production
function:
Yi = AiNi(1 − li) i = E,T, (1)
where Ai > 0 is the TFP and Ni is the number of households in country i. Since time
endowment is normalized to unity li is leisure and 1-li is the number of hours devoted to
working. Price of the good that is produced in the EU is chosen as the num´ eraire, i.e.; pE=1.
Since there is free trade between these two countries, the households in each country can
consume both of the goods without incurring any costs. The representative household in each
country has the same utility function of the form:
Ui = lncE
i + β lncT
i + lnli, (2)
where cE
i denotes the consumption of the good produced in the EU, cT
i denotes the consumption
of the good produced in Turkey, and β > 0 is the preference term for the Turkish good. The
European household maximizes (2) subject to:
wE(1 − lE) = cE
E + p cT
E
whereas the Turkish household maximizes (2) subject to:
p wT(1 − lT) = cE
T + p cT
T
where wE and wT denote wages in the EU and Turkey, respectively. p denotes the price of the
Turkish good.

























The ﬁrm in each country maximizes proﬁts subject to equation (1). Marginal productivity
of labor is thus equal to its factor price, which writes as
wi = Ai.
Equilibrium requires the clearance of goods’ markets. For any country i, her total produc-









We observe that an increase in AT will reduce the price of the Turkish good whereas an increase
in β and AE will increase it.
Now we can express equation (2) as follows:
UE = lnAE + β lnATNT − lnNE + (2 + β)ln(2 + β). (4)
As equation (4) demonstrates clearly, both TFP levels aﬀect the utility of the European house-
hold positively. This is a result of free trade between countries.
2.2 After Accession
Membership to the EU is conditioned on the rules that are deﬁned by Copenhagen Criteria,
which require the development of political, economic and legal institutions.3 Hence, accession
to the EU ensures a certain level of institutional development in the candidate member country.
On the other hand, there is a widespread belief that institutional development is an important
determinant of economic growth and development (North and Thomas 1973, North 1990).
In the empirical literature, a number of studies highlight the importance of this relationship
through diﬀerent channels of economic growth. Dawson (1998), Ayal and Karras (1998), and
3According to Copenhagen Presidency conclusions: ”Membership requires that candidate country has
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and,
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to
take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary
union.”
4Klein and Luu (2003) focus on institutions-productivity link and ﬁnd that institutions have a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on productivity.4
In our model, enhancement in institutions after Turkish accession is assumed to aﬀect
her economic performance by an improvement in TFP. We also consider the TFP growth
experiences of Spain and Portugal after their accession to the EU. Thus, after Turkish accession,
while the European household gives a lump-sump transfer to Turkey for redistribution, a
positive TFP shift occurs in Turkey. The new TFP parameter of Turkey becomes ˆ AT, which
writes as
ˆ AT = µAT
where µ > 1 refers to the TFP shift in Turkey due to her accession to the EU. The representative
European household maximizes her utility, which is equation (2) subject to the new budget
constraint:
wE(1 − lE) − θ = cE
E + p cT
E
where θ represents the lump-sum transfer given by the European household to the representa-
tive Turkish household. The representative Turkish household maximizes equation (2) subject
to her new budget constraint:




























β(p ˆ AT + θNE/NT)
p (2 + β)
,
lT =
p ˆ AT + θNE/NT
p (2 + β) ˆ AT
.
4Dawson (1998), Ayal and Karras (1998) employed economic freedom index (1995) as an indicator of insti-
tutional quality. This index was published in James Gwartney, Robert Lawson and Walter Block, Economic
Freedom of the World 1975-1995. Klein and Luu (2003), on the other hand, use ”Legal Structure and Property
Rights” index, which is the sub-component of the composite economic freedom index (2001).





Utility of the European household after accession reads
ˆ UE = (2 + β)ln (AE − θ) + β lnµATNT − β lnNE(βAE + θ) − lnAE − (2 + β)ln(2 + β) (5)
The European household will be willing to give a lump-sum transfer to the candidate
member country Turkey, if her utility level before Turkey’s accession is equal or higher than
her utility level before accession. We represent this problem for the maximum level of transfer
when the European household is indiﬀerent between two utility levels, which writes as
ˆ UE = UE (6)
where ˆ UE is the utility of the European household after accession. The proposition below
summarizes the results that are drawn by solving equation (6).
Proposition 1. There exists a unique positive θx, which is the solution to problem (6) if and
only if µ > 1. The higher µ, the higher the level of transfer that the European household is
willing to give.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 states that there is no positive level of transfer as a solution to equation (6),
when there is no TFP increase in Turkey, namely when µ=1. In other words, the European
household will be worse oﬀ upon Turkish accession unless she is compensated by a TFP increase
in Turkey. In fact, the representative European household consumes less European good and
has less leisure after she gives away transfer. Thus, only a utility gain due to an increase in
the consumption of the Turkish good through a decline in its price can oﬀset this utility loss.
Obviously, an increase in µ will lower the price of the Turkish good, and therefore will correct
for the utility loss of the European household.
3 The Model with Capital
In the previous section, we have considered the implications of a TFP increase in Turkey on
the level of transfer, when there is no capital in the model. In this section, we introduce capital
into the production function. We will compare the case, in which there is capital mobility only
after accession versus the case where capital is mobile already before accession.
3.1 The Benchmark Model
In this section, we introduce capital so that production is made through a Cobb-Douglas
constant returns to scale technology:
Yi = AiKα
i N1−α
i i = E,T,
6where K is capital, N is population size which is equal to labor supply and α is a constant
with 0 < α < 1. Capital and population of the EU are assumed to be larger than those of
Turkey (i.e. NE > NT and KE > KT). The representative household in each country has the
identical utility function, which reads
Ui = lncE
i + β lncT
i . (7)
Notice that there is no leisure term in the new utility function for the sake of analytic tractabil-







where RE is the interest factor in the EU. The representative Turkish household maximizes

































wi = (1 − α)AiKα
i N−α
i .









It is obvious that an increase in the TFP of Turkey will reduce p. We can write the utility













After accession, a lump-sum transfer is given to Turkish households whereas a TFP shift
occurs in Turkey. Moreover, capital is allowed to move freely between countries. Thus, the
representative household in the EU maximizes her utility function, which is equation (7) subject





− θ = cE
E + p cE
T ,









T + p cT
T
Notice that capital level of each country is diﬀerent from the initial capital. K′
E and K′
T stand
for capital stock in the EU and Turkey upon capital markets integration. A positive diﬀerence
between KE and K′
E corresponds to an outﬂow of the EU capital to Turkey, indicating an inﬂow
of capital to Turkey, and conversely a negative diﬀerence between KE and K′
E corresponds to
an inﬂow of the Turkish capital to the EU, meaning an outﬂow of capital from Turkey.



































wi = (1 − α)AiK′ α
i N−α
i .









8Equilibrium in capital markets requires that real interest factors should be equal:
pRT = RE.






Since sum of capital levels before and after capital mobility should be equal, capital levels upon











Now that we have found new capital levels in terms of initial capital levels, we can write
the utility of the European household for the cases where there is capital mobility.
¯ UE = ln
AE(KE + KT)αN−α
E





where ¯ UE denotes the utility of the European household when there is free capital mobility
before accession.
























where p stands for the new price of the Turkish good after accession when there is free capital







Now we will compare two diﬀerent cases. In the ﬁrst case, capital is mobile only after
Turkey’s accession; in the second case, capital is mobile both before and after accession. Solving
equation (6) for θ for equations (8) and (11) for the ﬁrst case and equations (10) and (11) for
the second case gives:




























9where ˜ θ is the level of transfer when there is no capital mobility before accession and there
is capital mobility after accession and ¯ θ is the level of transfer when there is already capital
mobility prior to accession.
Proposition 2. Assuming capital mobility before accession, there exists a unique positive ¯ θ
given by equation (13), which is the solution to equation (6) if and only if µ >1.
Proposition 2 is clear from equation (13) and it suggests that the utility loss of the European
household due to the lump-sum transfer can only be compensated by an increase in µ, which
reaﬃrms the discussion of Proposition 1. Hence, if capital markets have already been integrated
prior to Turkey’s accession, the result derived in the previous section is the same as the one
derived in this section. A value of µ higher than 1 leads to a decline in the price of the Turkish
good, and thus improves the utility of the European household, oﬀsetting her utility loss due
to the transfer. Not surprisingly, the higher µ, the higher the drop in the price of the Turkish
good, and accordingly, the higher the level of transfer (¯ θ) that the European household is
willing to give.
Proposition 3. Assuming no capital mobility before accession, there exists a unique positive
˜ θ given by equation (12), which is the solution to equation (6) if and only if µ ≥ 1. ˜ θ is higher
than ¯ θ for any µ ≥ 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3 implies that capital markets integration upon Turkish accession enables the
European household to improve her utility even if TFP shift does not arise in Turkey. Moreover,
a TFP increase in Turkey accompanied by free capital mobility further increases her utility,
thereby raising the level of transfer. Since a TFP increase in Turkey is required for ¯ θ to exist,
˜ θ is higher than ¯ θ for any value of µ, which is equal or bigger than 1. Also notice that capital
mobility is favorable for the EU, irrespective of which direction capital ﬂows, either to Turkey
or to the EU. This result follows from free trade between Turkey and the EU. Since each
good is consumed by each country’s households, an increase in any of the country’s stock of
capital, and therefore in that country’s production level raises the utility level of both countries’
households. However, if capital markets were already integrated before accession, the beneﬁts
of the capital mobility would be reaped prior to the membership of Turkey and thus capital
mobility would have no eﬀect on the level of transfer. In fact, Buch and Piazolo (2001) found
that EU membership has an insigniﬁcant impact on capital ﬂows for Spain wheras it has a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect for the old members of the EU. This result follows from the fact
that Spain allowed free mobility of capital before its accession.
To abolish capital controls until accession reduces representative European household’s
willingness to give a transfer to the new member’s representative household. As a result,
allowing for free capital mobility before accession appears to be unfavorable for admission. 5
5However the candidate member country may have some international commitments that it can not choose
to control capital ﬂows. Moreover the candidate may beneﬁt from free capital mobility in other arenas so that
it may choose to abolish capital controls. We do not consider these issues in our analysis.
103.3 Illustration
For illustrative purposes Figure 1 presents the distance between ˜ θ and ¯ θ, which is expressed
as the percentage of ¯ θ for varying levels of the TFP increase in Turkey ( µ). The parameters
which have been chosen to be consistent with the properties of the model and the data are:
β = 0.05,KE = 0.933,KT = 0.066 and α = 0.33. We observe that the distance between ˜ θ and
¯ θ is positive for all levels of µ. However the distance between two transfer levels decreases with
increasing levels of µ. In other words, the diﬀerence between two transfers resulting from the
positive eﬀect of the capital markets integration after accession diminishes as TFP growth is
higher in Turkey.
Figure 1: The Distance between Transfers (˜ θ and ¯ θ) as a Function of TFP increase









4 Policy Implications for Turkey
Turkey liberalized its capital account in 1989. As Turkish nationals were permitted to purchase
foreign securities and to borrow abroad without government permission, foreigners could buy
Turkish securities and could open Turkish Lira accounts convertible into foreign exchange.
After capital account liberalization, capital inﬂows to Turkey increased steadily after 1990,
with net capital inﬂows reaching more than three percent of GDP in 1996 and 1997, and more
than ﬁve percent of GDP in 2004 and 2005 (See Figure 2).
While portfolio investments, deposits, loans and trade credits constitute the bulk of capital
inﬂows, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) performance never reached 1 percent of GDP apart
from the exceptional year of 20016. According to policy makers the Foreign Investment Law
No: 6224, which was enacted in 1954 was insuﬃcient to induce the inﬂows of FDI. To this
6The reason for this year’s high performance compared to that of average is due to the sales revenue of third
GSM license, sale of a Savings Deposit and Insurance Fund bank to a foreign bank and ﬁnally the sale of equity
ownership of domestic automotive producer to the foreign partner.
11Figure 2: Net Capital Flows and FDI as percentage of GDP
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Source: T.R Prime Ministry State Planning Organization and World Bank.
end, in 2003 New Foreign Capital Law was introduced in order to make the investment envi-
ronment more eﬃcient and suitable for potential foreign investors by guaranteeing the transfer
of capital gains, fees, royalties and dividends. Moreover, sectors that foreign capital operates
were enlarged and free trade zones were created where foreign capital were allowed to operate
without restrictions (Dutz, Us, and Yilmaz, 2005). After the law went into eﬀect, a discernible
progress has been observed in FDI performance. Indeed, net FDI ﬂows reached 2,4 percent of
GDP in 2005.
By capital account liberalization and New Foreign Capital Law, Turkey seemed to lay down
the regulations required for free capital mobility before its accession into the EU. Furthermore,
repercussions of these regulations on capital ﬂows have been remarkable.7
Our model envisages that capital markets integration adds to the utility of the European
household irrespective of the direction of capital ﬂows. Nevertheless, if capital markets integra-
tion takes place before candidate country’s admission into the Union, the European household
would beneﬁt from the utility enhancing eﬀect of free capital mobility prior to the accession of
the candidate member country and would have no incentive to give a transfer. Since Turkey
has abolished all capital controls ﬁrst by capital account liberalization and second by Foreign
Capital Law, the incentive of the EU to give a transfer to Turkey for redistribution policy
turns out to diminish according to our model.
7The premature opening of the capital account without sound monetary and exchange rate policies led to the
1994 currency crisis in Turkey. See Ertugrul and Selcuk (2001), Ozatay (2000), Celasun (1998) for an extensive
discussion.
125 Conclusion
Our aim in this paper was to show ﬁrst whether a TFP increase in Turkey after her accession
compensates the cost of redistribution policy in the EU and second whether free capital mobility
before accession is unfavorable for admission to the Union.
Bearing in mind the TFP growth experiences of Portugal and Spain after their membership
to the EU, we have assumed that the European household gives a lump-sump transfer to the
Turkish household for redistribution in the EU, whereas an upward shift arises in Turkey due
to the positive eﬀect of accession on institutional development. Thereafter, we have considered
the utility of the European household and searched for the maximum level of transfer when
she is indiﬀerent between her utility before and after accession. There is a direct positive link
between the production, and thus a TFP increase in Turkey and the utility of the European
household under the assumption of free trade between countries, which makes available the
consumption of the Turkish good in the EU without any additional cost. In this regard,
an increase in the TFP of Turkey lowers the price of the Turkish good, which leads to an
improvement in the utility of the European household, and accordingly compensates the cost
of transfer. Thus, we have shown that a TFP increase in Turkey after her accession may
compensate the cost of the redistribution policy in the EU, thereby eliminating one of the
economic obstacles to Turkish admission into the Union.
To give an answer to the second question, we have analyzed the eﬀects of capital markets
integration on the level of transfer. Capital mobility after accession, which accompanies the
TFP increase, further improves the utility of the European household, leading to an increase
in the transfer level. In fact, capital markets integration increases the European household’s
utility irrespective of the direction of capital ﬂows. This result again follows from the positive
relationship between Turkey’s production and the utility of the European household. Never-
theless, capital mobility has no eﬀect on the level of transfer, if it is allowed before accession. In
this case, European households would already proﬁt from capital mobility through an increase
in their utility before Turkey’s accession.
Our analysis suggests that a TFP growth in Turkey after accession may compensate the
cost of redistribution policy through its positive impact on the utility of incumbent members’
households. On the other hand, capital markets integration may have no eﬀect on the redis-
tribution policy since Turkey has already laid down the regulations required for free capital
mobility before accession.
Several extensions may undoubtedly enrich the model. It would for example be interesting
to introduce free labor mobility in the model. Besides, endogenizing TFP would improve the
quality of the model. These issues are left for future research.
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14A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
When equation (6) holds, we have
(βAE + θ)A
2/β
E       
f(x)
= βµ(AE − θ)(2+β)/β









(y) = −(2 + β)µ(AE − θ)2/β < 0







There is an intersection point between these two functions, and hence a unique solution to
equation (6) if f(y) > f(x) when θ = 0. Thus, µ should be higher than 1 (µ > 1).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2










To prove this inequality, we must show that these two functions have only one intersection
point and the function on the right hand side is concave. Since β = KT
KE is the only intersection
point, the next step is to prove the concavity of the right hand side function.
A continuous and diﬀerentiable function is concave in a variable, if its second derivative
with respect to this variable is smaller than 0. Let us say that KT













(1 + β)2 x(−2−β)/(1+β) < 0,
15which gives the result.
To show that ˜ θ is higher than ¯ θ, we can arrange equation (13) in the form:













 β/(1+β) α  
.
Now, it is easier to notice that ˜ θ is higher than ¯ θ when µ = 1 as long as condition (14)
holds. Since we have proved this condition above, ˜ θ is higher than ¯ θ for any value of µ, which
is equal or higher than 1.
16